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Abstract
Feldstein (1992, 1997) invokes Friedman’s (1953) classic case for flexible
exchange rates to argue that the single currency of the European Monetary Union will
hinder adjustments that might have occurred through real exchange rate movements under
a more flexible exchange rate system.  The extent of local-currency pricing among
European countries undermines this view.  The prices that consumers pay for imported
goods are not much influenced by changes in nominal exchange rates in the short run.  The
channels for adjustment through relative price changes are considerably narrowed when
local-currency pricing predominates.  New evidence is presented that reaffirms the
predominance of local-currency pricing for consumer prices in Europe.  The optimum
currency area analysis is reexamined in a Mundell-Fleming framework with local-currency
pricing.1
There is little consensus among economists that Europe is well suited for a single currency.
Frequently, commentators offer the opinion that the chief benefits of currency union for Europe are
political, but that more flexible exchange rates are preferable if the choice of monetary system were
based solely on economic considerations.  Feldstein (1992, 1997) perhaps most prominently
expresses those views.
The argument for more flexible rates in Europe is straightforward.  Suppose there is some shock
to the economy that requires prices of German goods to rise relative to the prices of French goods.
For example, Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1993) argue that the fiscal expansion that followed German
unification necessitated an increase in the price of German goods relative to other EMS countries.
Such a relative price change has an automatic stabilizing effect on output. It leads to a trade balance
deficit as Germans and other Europeans shift demand away from German goods toward goods
produced in other countries.
How is this increase in the price of German goods to be achieved?  In the traditional view of the
macroeconomic adjustment process, the “law of one price” holds.  Let  P G  be the price of a good
produced in Germany and sold in Germany.  The price of that German-produced good sold in France
is denoted PG G P E = , where E denotes the mark price of francs.  According to the traditional
view, if an increase in  G P  relative to the price of the French good (P F ) is required, there are two
means by which that could be achieved:  P G  could increase (or P F  could fall); or, the exchange rate
could decline.
Feldstein (1992) makes the case that flexible exchange rates facilitate adjustment:
A currency union means, of course, that nominal exchange rates cannot adjust to
achieve a needed change in the real exchange rate.  The local price level must,
therefore, adjust to bring about the change in the real exchange rate.  Thus a 10% fall
in the real value of a currency can be achieved either by a 10% fall in the nominal
exchange rate or by a 10% fall in local wages and prices.2
Either form of adjustment can bring the real exchange rate to its equilibrium value,
but a decline in domestic prices is likely to require a period of increased
unemployment.  It would certainly be better to have a decline in the nominal exchange
rate.  The shift to a single currency in Europe would preclude such nominal exchange-
rate adjustments and force real exchange-rate reductions to be achieved through
lower local wages and prices.
The argument echoes Friedman’s (1953) classic case for flexible exchange rates.  In a similar
vein, Obstfeld (1997) argues that Europe is not an optimum currency area, as defined by Mundell
(1961).   The Friedman-Feldstein analysis of the benefits of floating exchange rates is dependent on
their view of how prices are set.  In particular, it pays insufficient attention to the recent evidence of
significant local-currency pricing.
Consider the simple law-of-one-price model that underlies the Friedman-Feldstein analysis.  In
this formulation, the German producer sets its price in deutschemarks.  The price  P G  is charged to
German consumers and is unresponsive to changes in demand.  When the mark appreciates the
French franc price of the good sold to French consumers increases.  The empirical evidence suggests
that a better model of reality, at least for a large number of goods, is that German producers treat the
German market for their goods separately from the French market.  They choose a mark price,  P G ,
for the good sold in the German market, and a franc price, PG, for the good sold in the French
market.  Both of these prices are inflexible – neither responds when the exchange rate changes.  The
automatic stabilizing property of exchange rates vanishes when there is no “exchange-rate pass-
through” to local prices.  Likewise, the price of French goods does not fall for the German
consumer, because the French firm sets a price in marks for selling its good to German consumers, at
P F  (and a price in francs for French consumers, P F .)
There are, of course, real effects of the nominal exchange rate changes.  When the mark
appreciates, but PG, the French franc price of German-produced goods, does not change, the3
revenue (in mark terms) for the German firm declines.  Conversely, the franc revenue for the French
firm selling goods in Germany increases.  There can be a channel through which the changes in firms’
profits stabilize swings in aggregate demand.  The decline in profits of German firms, and increase in
profits of French firms, will have the effect of lowering demand in Germany and raising it in France.
But this channel for stabilization is likely to be much weaker than the one posited by Friedman
and Feldstein.  The exchange rate change does not induce consumers to switch demand away from
German goods toward French goods.  Instead, there is an income effect.  Lower profits for German
firms reduce income for German owners of those firms, and conversely in France.  To the extent that
spending in each country is biased toward goods produced in that country, there will be a relative
increase in demand for French products resulting from the mark appreciation.  This effect is likely
not to be strong unless profits are a relatively large fraction of income, and there is a strong home-
country bias in spending.
In fact, there are several considerations that weaken this profit channel for influencing aggregate
demand.  First, firms can hedge their foreign exchange exposure.  By selling francs forward for
marks at a sufficient number of horizons into the future, or making use of other derivative markets,
the German firm can insulate its profits from short-run fluctuations in the exchange rate.  Second, the
firms may not need to protect their bottom line from foreign exchange fluctuations because firm
owners might do the diversification.  Our assumption so far has been that German consumers own
German firms and French consumers own French firms.  In fact, while there is a home bias in asset
holdings, there has been an increasing degree of internationalization of financial markets.  Particularly
within Europe, in which there are few barriers to capital flows, international diversification of
portfolios is on the rise.  The income of a German who owns shares of both German firms and
French firms will not be affected much by exchange rate changes.4
Another consideration is the fact that many of the firm’s costs are incurred in the foreign
currency.  In order to sell its product in France, the German firm must pay for advertising,
distribution and retailing in French francs.  Particularly for consumer goods, these marketing and
distribution costs can account for a significant fraction of the cost of the good.  So the amount of
exposure the German firm has to foreign exchange rate changes depends on the fraction of its costs
that are in marks versus francs. Finally, a practical consideration is one of information.  In the short
run, the firm’s foreign exchange profits or losses are not observed by shareholders who are not
completely informed of the firm’s foreign exchange exposure because the amount of hedging by the
firm is not continuously reported.  Frequently, the markets are not aware of significant gains or
losses on foreign exchange markets until annual reports are compiled.  So, even if the firm has not
fully protected itself against foreign exchange fluctuations, the shareholders may not realize this and
fail to adjust fully their assessment of the value of the firm.
Recent empirical studies suggest that consumer prices are not very responsive to exchange rate
changes.  For example, Engel (1993) finds that for differentiated consumer products, there is
virtually no response of consumer prices to exchange rate changes, while the law of one price
appears to hold much better for simple homogenous products such as fresh fruits and vegetables.
Engel (1999) finds that well over 95 per cent of real exchange rate movements among major
industrialized countries are attributable to failures of the law of one price.  However, studies of
consumer prices suffer from the problem that the data do not distinguish the location of the producer
of the products.  Thus, the data do not account for the differences in the mix of products by location
of producer in each buyer location.  (That is, German consumer price indexes are likely to reflect a
preponderance of German-produced goods, as compared to price indexes in other countries that give
smaller weight to German-produced goods.)  Keeping in mind that caveat, the greater5
unresponsiveness of consumer prices as compared to export prices suggests that the marketers and
distributors of goods in the consumers’ locale also must cushion the effect of exchange rate changes
on prices by allowing their profit margins to vary with exchange rates.
To be clear, consideration of the implications of local-currency pricing do not constitute an
argument for fixed exchange rates or for a single currency in Europe.  It merely weakens the case for
flexible exchange rates.
In section 1, I present some new evidence on the failure of the law of one price in Europe.  The
evidence indicates there is local-currency pricing for consumer goods, and that consumer goods
prices do not respond to exchange rate changes.  Then, in section 2, I formally review the argument
for flexible exchange rates in the traditional Mundell-Fleming model, and demonstrate how that
argument is refuted when there is little exchange-rate pass-through.  The concluding section
summarizes some of the shortcomings of this analysis and points to directions for future research.
1.  Empirical Evidence
How do consumer prices in Europe respond to exchange rate changes?  Consider the log of the
price of a good, call it good i,  pit  in one country relative to the log of the price of the same good in
another country, pit .  Under the law of one price assumption, changes in  pit it -p  should exactly
match changes in the log of the exchange rate, et .  Here, we examine that proposition taking two
different approaches.  If exchange rate changes worked their way into prices relatively rapidly, then
annual changes in  pit it -p  should be highly correlated with annual changes in et ; or, equivalently,
annual changes in et  should be nearly uncorrelated with annual changes in e p t it it + - p .6
Alternatively, if there are short-term deviations from the law of one price that are eliminated over
time, then  pit it -p  should adjust when there are deviations from the law of one price.
We present evidence on both of these concepts of the law of one price using price index data for
twenty-two categories of goods for nine European countries: Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Spain,
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom.  The data are monthly.  The length
of the series varies.  The longest runs from January 1977 to December 1995, and the shortest runs
from April 1982 to July 1995.  Many of the series are monthly from January 1981 to July 1995.  The
data were obtained from Eurostat’s consumer price data base.
1
The categories of consumer goods involve different levels of aggregation.  Some of the series are
highly aggregated: food, clothing and footwear, household equipment.  Other categories are
substantially more disaggregated: fruit, books, hotels.  Clearly, none of the data is so disaggregated
that it actually compares prices of identical products across countries.
Another shortcoming of the data, for our purposes, is that the data are indexes rather than price
level data.  Hence, we cannot examine directly the degree of failure of the law of one price.  Instead,
we can only infer failures by examining changes in  pit it -p  and et .
First, consider the behavior of nominal exchange rates and relative prices.  If the law of one price
holds, there should be no correlation of the nominal exchange rate and the relative price,
e p t it it + - p .   No economist would expect instantaneous changes in nominal prices in response to
market changes.  We interpret the short-run law of one price as saying that annual changes in the
                                               
1   There were quite a few data entry errors in the data set obtained from Eurostat.  In cases where there were more
than a few errors in one series, the series was dropped.  Hence, there is not data for all nine countries for all of the
goods.  In cases where data entry errors were near the beginning or end of the series, the series were truncated.  In
some cases, the data was corrected from other sources.  In some cases the entry error involved a transposition of digits
which was corrected.  In the remaining cases, the data points were replaced using interpolation from adjacent data
points.  The total number of data points used in the tables that are corrected data is 99 (out of a total of approximately7
exchange rate are uncorrelated with annual changes in e p t it it + - p .  The upper triangle of the
matrices in Table 1 report these correlations.  In fact, these correlations are generally very high.  For
all but a few goods, the vast majority of correlation coefficients are over 0.70.  Approximately half
are over 0.90 for most goods.  So the pattern of correlations is much closer to what one would
expect in the extreme case of no exchange-rate pass-through than to the zero correlation predicted
by the law of one price.
For some simple goods sold in relatively competitive markets (fruit and fuel and energy being
notable examples), the correlations are lower – in the neighborhood of 0.30 to 0.40 for many country
pairs.  But for the categories of goods that include differentiated products sold by monopolistically
competitive firms – for example, domestic appliances, sound and photographic equipment, furniture,
books – the correlations are extremely high.  One exception to these generally high correlations is for
relative prices between Germany and the Netherlands.  Here, the correlations are much lower than
for other country pairs, suggesting that the German-Dutch market is much more unified than other
markets.
A different approach to the law of one price is that price differentials may crop up between
locations, but they are eliminated over time through price adjustment.  This approach can be
expressed in the error-correction equation:
(1) D D D ( ) ( ) ( ) p p e e p it it it it t j t j j
k
j it j it j j
k
- = - - - + + - - = - - = ￿ ￿ p a b p l g p 0 1 ,
where D  refers to the monthly change.  This equation states that when the relative price,
e p t it it + - p  is above its mean or long-run value,  pit it -p  adjusts to eliminate those deviations from
                                                                                                                                                           
40,000 data points.)  A list of corrections is available on request from the author.  The original data is sold by
Eurostat.8
the law of one price.  The parameter b is a measure of how much of the deviation is eliminated after
one month.
Equation (1) is estimated for each relative price series – for each good and each country pair.
The lag length k was chosen by an iterative procedure.  Initially the equation is estimated with eight
lags of Det j -  and D( ) pit j it j - - -p .  If the sixteen estimated lag parameters (lj  and g j ,  j = 12 8 , , , K )
are not jointly significant, the eighth lag is dropped and the equation is reestimated with seven lags.
This procedure is repeated until the k lags are jointly significant.
2
The values of the estimated parameter b are reported in the bottom triangle of the matrices in
Table 1.  If adjustment to the law of one price were rapid, the estimated b coefficient would be
close to unity.  For a few goods – again, fruit and fuel and energy stand out – the estimated values of
b  are near to unity.  In fact, many of the estimated coefficients in the fruit regression exceed one.
But for most goods, the b  coefficients are much smaller, frequently between 0.10 and 0.25.  Again,
exceptions to this general rule are the coefficients for the Germany-Netherlands regressions, which
tend to be much closer to unity.
The table reports tests of the null hypothesis that b = 0.  Under this null, there is no adjustment
in prices toward the long-run law of one price.  The relative price in this case has a unit root.  The
test of b = 0 is a test of cointegration between  pit it -p  and et .  Zivot (1995) develops this single-
equation cointegration test (when the cointegration vector is known to be (1,-1).) Critical values are
derived in Hansen (1995).
The null that  pit it -p  and et  are not cointegrated should not be taken literally.  Failure to reject
the null should be interpreted as meaning that the test does not have sufficient power to reject the
                                               
2   This is the procedure advocated by Ng and Perron (1995).9
null in our samples.  Still, Zivot (1995) shows his test has quite good power in general.  So the
surprising result is that convergence to the law of one price is so slow that we cannot reject the null
of no cointegration for most relative prices even with 15-18 years of monthly data.  For most relative
price series, we fail to reject the null for a majority of country pairs.  The exceptions to this are bread
and cereal products, dairy products, fruit, fuel and energy, rent and public transportation.
3
So for most categories of goods, there is not even evidence that deviations from the law of one
price tend to be eliminated.  The evidence from both types of tests for the law of one price
demonstrate that, especially for categories of differentiated consumer products, price differentials do
not respond much to exchange rate changes.
2.  The Model
We will demonstrate how local-currency pricing reduces the desirability of floating exchange
rates in a simple Mundell-Fleming model.  The fixed versus floating debate for Europe has largely
been carried out (sometimes implicitly) in the context of the Mundell-Fleming model, so this model is
the appropriate venue to consider the implications of local-currency pricing.  However, in this model,
behavior is not based explicitly on optimization.  Problems that arise with assessing the value of a
floating exchange rate system in such a model are discussed in the concluding section.  Recent
models (for example, Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998) and Corsetti and Pesenti (1998)) replicate
many of the features of the Mundell-Fleming model in optimizing frameworks.  Betts and Devereux
(1996, 2000) and Devereux and Engel (1998) examine some of the implications of pricing to market
and sticky nominal prices in models of dynamic utility maximization.
                                               
3   Public transportation refers to transport that is shared, such as rail and air travel.  It is generally a traded good.10
We compare the short-run volatility of output in response to aggregate demand shocks in two
models: the standard Mundell-Fleming model and the Mundell-Fleming model local-currency pricing.
Feldstein and Friedman cast their argument in terms of short-run volatility; in the long run, nominal
prices adjust so the choice of nominal exchange rate regime is immaterial.
The standard Mundell-Fleming model (under the law of one price) assumes that demand for
domestic output, y, comes from consumption less imports (c - m), exports (x), investment and an
exogenous shift factor (g).
(2) y c y q m y q f i x y q g = - ￿ + + + ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( , )
* .
with  0 1 < ¢ < c .  The real exchange rate is defined as the relative price of foreign goods, so import
demand falls as q rises (and import demand increases with income): m m c q y < < < ¢ < 0 0 1 ; .
Investment demand depends inversely on the interest rate i:   ¢ < f 0.
4  Foreign demand for exports
from the home country depends directly on foreign income and the real exchange rate:
x x y q > > 0 0 ; .
The IS curve in the foreign country is analogous:
(3) y c y
q
x y q m y q f i g
* * * * * * * ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( ) = - + + +
1
.
In financial markets, there is perfect capital mobility so uncovered interest parity holds:





where e is the nominal exchange rate, so that De
e
e
 is the expected percentage change in the
exchange rate.
                                               
4   Investment depends on the nominal interest rate for simplicity.  In the examples we will look at, in which there are
changes in relative demand, nominal prices turn out not to change in equilibrium.  So, there is no difference between
the real and nominal interest rates.11
In each country, real money demand falls as the interest rate rises, and rises with increases in
income.  So, in the home country
(5) h p i y h = l( , ),  l i < 0 and l y > 0.
where h is the home money supply, and ph is the home currency price of home goods.  In the foreign
country is an analogous money demand equation:
(6) h i y f
* * * * ( , ), p = l   l i
* < 0 and l y
* > 0
where p f  is the foreign-currency price of foreign-produced goods.









There are two periods in the model.  The second period represents the long run in which nominal
prices are completely flexible and output is produced at the full-employment levels, which are
exogenously given as  y  and  y
*.  We will not consider changes in the money supply, so there is no
permanent inflation or depreciation.  There is no expected change in the exchange rate in the long
run, so i i =
*.  Equations (2) and (3) determine the long-run real exchange rate level and the long-
run interest rate.  Note, then, that money is neutral in the long run.  From equation (5), ph is
proportional to h, and from equation (6), p f  is proportional to h
*.  We will consider effects of
shocks that affect the composition of aggregate demand between the home and foreign country, but
not the level of aggregate demand.  That is, we will assume
(8) dg q dg + ￿ =
* 0,
where dx (x = g,g
*) refers to the differential of x.12
First, we derive the change in the long-run exchange rate.  In the long run there is no expected
change in the exchange rate, so from equation (4), we have 
* i i = .
5  (An overbar represents long-run
values.)  In the long-run, output in both countries is at its full-employment levels.  So, in taking the
total differentials of equations (2) and (3),  0 = y d ,  0
* = y d , and 
* i d i d = .  Initially  1 = q .
(9) dg q d x i d f q d m q d m q i q + + + - ￿ - = 0 .
(10)
* * 0 dg i d f q d m q d x q d x i q q + + + - ￿ = .
Assume that trade is balanced initially, so that  m x = .  Using  0
* = + dg dg , we have, adding
equation (10) to equation (9):
i d f f i i ) ( 0
* + = ,
which implies  0 = i d  in the long run.  Then, using (9) we have that the long-run change in the real








where W = + - e e x m 1, and ex
q x
x
=  is the elasticity of demand for exports, and em
q m
m
= -  is the
elasticity of import demand.  We assume W > 0 which is the Marshall-Lerner condition.
Since  y  and i  do not change in the long run, and the money supply, h , of the domestic country
is constant, then from equation (5),  h p  does not change in the long run when there is a change in
aggregate demand.  Likewise, from equation (6),  f p  does not change.  So the real exchange rate
adjustment is achieved completely through an adjustment of the nominal exchange rate.  The change
in the long-run nominal exchange rate is given by:
                                               










Now consider the short run in the standard Mundell-Fleming model.  Nominal prices do not
adjust immediately in response to changes in aggregate demand.  But the key assumption in this type
of model is that prices are fixed in the sellers’ currencies.  That is,  ph and p f  are fixed.  The law of
one price holds for each good, so that the foreign currency price of domestic goods is 
p
e
h  and the
domestic currency price of foreign goods is e f p .  With  ph and p f  fixed, the real exchange rate q
moves one-for-one with changes in the nominal exchange rate, e.
We assume that expectations are rational, so that investors expect the exchange rate to equal its










Under this set of assumptions, we arrive at a standard result in the Mundell-Fleming model: the
short-run change in the exchange rate is exactly the same as the long run (as given in equation (12)).
When there are real demand shocks (subject to restriction (8)), there is no need for nominal prices to
adjust.  Nominal exchange rates by themselves achieve all of the needed price adjustment, and even









Next consider the alternative view of short-run pricing behavior by firms.  We take the opposite
extreme from the Mundell model (which assumes 100 per cent exchange rate pass through) and
assume no exchange rate pass through.  Prices are sticky in the buyers’ currencies.  So, import
demand is a function of income, z, and the relative price of foreign goods:14
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where pf is the domestic currency price of the foreign good paid by home residents, and ph is the
domestic currency price of the home good paid by home residents.  (Note that income, z, is not
necessarily equal to the value of output, y.  That will be discussed in more detail momentarily.)  Since
in the short run pf and ph are fixed, changes in the nominal exchange rate have no direct influence on
import demand.






, which also is not directly influenced by the nominal exchange rate.
Similarly, demand for exports from the home country are influenced by foreign income and the
prices faced by foreigners:












* is foreign income, p f  is the foreign currency price of the foreign good paid by foreigners,
and ph is the foreign currency price of the home good paid by foreigners.  Since p f  and ph are
fixed, there is no direct influence of changes in the exchange rate on foreigners’ demand for exports.
The quantity of goods produced domestically is given by y.  If the law of one price held, it would
be simple to evaluate sales of goods in real terms.  As in the Mundell model, the real value of sales is
simply the quantity of goods sold.  But, in our model, output sold to foreigners is sold at a different
price than identical output sold to domestic residents.  The domestic currency value of exports is







.   But, for all of the
reasons discussed in the introductory section, only a fraction k of foreign exchange earnings are15
considered to be part of income in the short run.  Accordingly, real home income evaluated at
domestic prices is:






= - - ( ) 1
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,
where 0 1 < < k .  Foreign income is defined analogously:
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.
The equilibrium condition in the domestic goods market is now given by:

















Similarly, the equation for the foreign IS curve is given by:
















The Appendix derives the expression for the change in the exchange rate in this model in the case
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0 and W is defined above.  Note that as long as W > k
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Short-run overshooting of the exchange rate is consistent with the extreme volatility of modern
floating exchange rate regimes.  The exchange rate change has very little effect on the goods market
                                                                                                                                                           
6   Though changes in the exchange rate directly influence income, z, as discussed below.16
in the short run.  Hence, in order to achieve financial market equilibrium, large swings in the
exchange rate are required.








































= - > > 0.
In this model, Mundell’s argument in favor of floating exchange rates is very much mitigated.
The insulating properties of flexible exchange rates are much smaller when there is a substantial
amount of pricing to market.  In the Mundell model, exchange rate changes effectively completely
offset the relative demand shock, so that there are no output effects.  But, when there is pricing to
market, and very little exchange-rate pass-through, floating exchange rates have only a small
stabilizing effect.  In this case, changes in the exchange rate have little effect on goods markets in the
short-run, so they are not a channel through which adjustment to shocks to the real sector can occur.
3.  Conclusions
The Friedman-Feldstein case for flexible exchange rates must be reexamined in light of the
evidence for pricing to market.  The stabilizing role of flexible exchange rates may not be so strong
when producers set prices in the consumer’s currency.
In practice, exchange-rate pass-through is not the same for all goods, nor for producers in all
countries.  Even the limited evidence we have presented suggests there is more pass-through for
simple, homogeneous goods than for complex goods produced by monopolists or monopolistic17
competitors.  Evidence from Goldberg and Knetter (1997) seems to indicate there is more pass-
through directly to export prices than there is to prices of finished goods sold to consumers.  A
complete analysis requires consideration of the causes of these varying pricing practices.
The Mundell-Fleming model assigns labor markets a secondary role.  But many authors have
noted that labor market behavior is key to the understanding of adjustment in European economies.
It has been observed that Europe is characterized by a high degree of real-wage rigidity, which leads
to very slow adjustment of Europe’s labor markets.  Obstfeld (1997), for one, investigates the
implications of this real-wage rigidity for the choice of exchange-rate regime.
Our concern with the viability of floating exchange rates has been mainly with the stability of
output.  A more comprehensive analysis would compare overall economic welfare with varying
degrees of pricing in local versus producer’s currencies under fixed and floating exchange rates.
Devereux and Engel (1998) have recently compared fixed and floating exchange rate regimes in
intertemporal optimizing models with uncertainty.  Their concern is how welfare comparisons
between the two exchange-rate regimes are affected by price-setting behavior.  They find that local-
currency pricing strengthens the case for flexible exchange rates.  However, their concern is solely
with transmission of monetary shocks.  They do not consider the goods-market shocks that Feldstein
puts at the center of his analysis.  Indeed, it would seem that monetary transmission is not so relevant
an issue for the EMU, where it is generally presumed that overall monetary stability will be enhanced
under the European central bank.
Devereux and Engel (1998) assume a complete market of state-contingent nominal bonds.  When












Here, u represents the instantaneous utility function, c (
* c ) is per capital consumption in the home
(foreign) country, and  p (
* p ) is the price index for consumption in the home (foreign) country.
When the law of one price holds, and under the assumption of identical preferences made by
Devereux and Engel, purchasing power parity holds as well.  In that case 
* sp p = , and so equation
(23) indicates that there is complete consumption insurance: 
* c c = .  On the other hand, when prices
are set in consumers’ currencies, the law of one price and purchasing power parity fail.  In that case,
consumption is not equalized across countries.  This leads us to similar conclusions as we found in
our ad hoc IS-LM model.  We can conclude that under floating rates and the law of one price,
consumption is stabilized across countries.  In response to shocks, there is no idiosyncratic
fluctuations in consumption across countries, only fluctuations in world consumption.  This is exactly
what we found in the IS-LM model, where we examined offsetting demand shocks at home and
abroad so there were no fluctuations in world output.  We found that local fluctuations in output
(and hence consumption) are completely eliminated when PPP holds.  On the other hand, if there is
pricing in producers’ currencies and the law of one price holds, equation (23) shows that there will
be idiosyncratic differences in home and foreign consumption, which corresponds to the results we
found in the IS-LM model with local-currency pricing.
There are some important differences in IS-LM models and the models based on
intertemporal optimization of Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995, 1998) and Devereux and Engel (1998).
The IS-LM models are not genuinely forward-looking and ignore budget constraints facing
consumers, firms and governments.  Both sets of models, however, retain the central feature19
explored here: with local-currency pricing, nominal exchange rate changes do not affect relative
prices faced by consumers.20
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Appendix
We modify the money demand equations so they are function of income:
(A.1) h p i z h = l( , ),
(A.2) h i z f
* * * * ( , ), p = l
In this model, pf, ph, p f  and ph are all fixed in the short-run.  For simplicity, we set those prices
equal to one.
We totally differentiate equations (4), (16), (17), (18), (19), (A.1) and (A.2) evaluating the
derivatives at e e p p h f h f = = = = = = p p 1, and x m = :
(A.3) di di de de = + -
* .
(A.4) dz dy xkde = + .
(A.5) dz dy xk de
* * * = - .
(A.6) dy c dz m dz f di x dz dg z z i z = - + + +
* .
(A.7) dy c dz x dz f di m dz dg z z i z
* * * * * * * = - + + + .
(A.8) 0 = + + l l l i z z di dy xkde.
(A.9) 0 = + - l l l i z z di dy k xde
* * * * * * .
For simplicity, consider the symmetrical case in which c c z z =
*,  f f i i =
*, l l i i =
* , l l z z =
*
and k k =
*.  Then, add equations (A.4) and (A.5) together to get
dz dz dy dy + = +
* *.
Then, recalling we are examining the case in which dg dg + =
* 0, add together equations
(A.6) and (A.7) to get
(A.10) ( )( ) ( )
* * 1- + = + c dy dy f di di z i .2
Add equations (A.8) and (A.9) to get
(A.11) 0 = + + + l l i y di di dy dy ( ) ( )
* * .
Equations (A.10) and (A.11) imply dy dy + =
* 0, and di di + =
* 0, which in turn imply
dz dz + =
* 0.  So the effects on the two countries are symmetric – the change in output and interest
rates in the home country are exactly the opposite of the change in the foreign country.  We can then
reduce the system to one of three equations that will solve for dz, de and di:
(A.12) dz kxde c m x dz f di dg z z z i - = - - + + ( ) .
(A.13) 2di de de = - .
(A.14) 0 = + l l i z di dz .
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0 and W is defined above.  Note that as long as W > k
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Correlations of 12-month Changes in Relative Prices and Nominal Exchange Rates
and
Estimated Response of Prices to Deviations from the Law of One Price
Food – Series 1110 (1/77 - 2/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.432 0.725 0.888 0.613 0.836 0.726 0.673 0.926
dk 0.461* 0.53 0.921 0.773 0.932 0.554 0.671 0.938
de 0.513* 0.383* 0.853 0.583 0.811 0.572 0.615 0.961
es 0.347* 0.273* 0.338* 0.919 0.891 0.843 0.728 0.896
fr 0.652* 0.334 0.329* 0.303* 0.945 0.597 0.725 0.934
it 0.219 0.106 0.18 0.279 0.121 0.827 0.76 0.936
nl 0.4* 0.228 1.94* 0.224* 0.101 0.0909 0.615 0.955
pt 0.189 0.178 0.174 0.318* 0.215 0.3* 0.111 0.754
uk 0.0999 0.0387 0.034 0.205 0.00791 0.0152 -0.00188 0.103
Bread and Cereals – Series 1111 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it pt uk
be 0.623 0.823 0.96 0.826 0.965 0.589 0.944
dk 0.729* 0.548 0.919 0.478 0.902 0.495 0.939
de 0.101 0.121 0.927 0.659 0.883 0.514 0.956
es 0.405* 0.424* 0.334* 0.954 0.958 0.461 0.927
fr 1.12* 0.314* 0.0883 0.566* 0.973 0.541 0.914
it 0.138 0.000481 -0.0119 0.561* 0.0017 0.684 0.907
pt 0.935* 0.936* 0.885* 0.891* 0.843* 0.51* 0.641
uk 0.0916 0.102 0.0454 0.224 0.16 0.124 0.659*Meat – Series 1112 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.317 0.763 0.901 0.82 0.945 0.814 0.312 0.934
dk 0.513* 0.552 0.832 0.428 0.862 0.671 0.167 0.917
de 0.0352 0.426* 0.8 0.702 0.899 0.631 0.187 0.95
es 0.673* 0.468* 0.251 0.88 0.865 0.827 0.495 0.808
fr 0.276* 0.532* 0.0593 0.658* 0.973 0.764 0.192 0.934
it 0.0639 0.0832 0.0095 0.613* 0.0123 0.922 0.445 0.932
nl 0.0496 0.45* 1.11* 0.273 0.0416 0.0566 0.223 0.956
pt 0.21 0.389* 0.12 0.63* 0.264 0.0982 0.149 0.457
uk 0.0281 0.00224 -0.014 0.242 0.0365 0.0727 0.0143 0.16
Dairy Products – Series 1114 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl uk
be 0.471 0.672 0.88 0.76 0.947 0.62 0.899
dk 0.67* 0.404 0.859 0.543 0.877 0.438 0.879
de 0.0713 0.544* 0.862 0.705 0.842 0.55 0.977
es 0.174 0.343* 0.105 0.909 0.896 0.848 0.833
fr 0.396* 0.957* 0.184* 0.311* 0.953 0.669 0.911
it 0.0226 0.295* -0.0026 0.169 0.0796 0.826 0.906
nl 0.108 0.728* 1.15* 0.137 0.18 0.0699 0.969
uk 0.0611 0.227 0.0642 0.0804 0.122 0.0658 0.132
Fruit – Series 1116 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl uk
be 0.18 0.169 0.544 0.344 0.527 0.257 0.74
dk 1.43* 0.0243 0.653 0.214 0.704 -0.00169 0.753
de 2.73* 2.76* 0.603 0.237 0.515 0.176 0.67
es 1.74* 1.52* 2.56* 0.642 0.434 0.465 0.663
fr 2.67* 1.66* 2.58* 1.73* 0.678 0.0545 0.723
it 1.28* 0.699* 2.04* 1.21* 0.855* 0.636 0.612
nl 1.82* 1.11* 2.94* 1.25* 0.99* 0.577* 0.723
uk 1.47* 0.771* 1.55* 1.78* 0.987* 0.563* 0.531*Alcoholic and non-Alcoholic Drinks – Series 1150 (1/81 - 7/95)
be de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.803 0.916 0.817 0.973 0.788 0.647 0.968
de 0.169 0 0.909 0.731 0.926 0.416 0.65 0.947
es 0.13 0.111 0.896 0.912 0.886 0.402 0.917
fr 0.536* 0.0698 0.133* 0.98 0.693 0.592 0.959
it 0.0646 -0.00168 0.0994 0.0138 0.915 0.649 0.964
nl 0.266 0.908* 0.102 0.261* 0.0687 0.639 0.944
pt 0.234* 0.218* 0.246* 0.242* 0.209* 0.251* 0.629
uk 0.124 0.107 0.144 0.135 0.0582 0.156 0.189*
Clothing and Footwear – Series 1200 (1/77 - 10/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.675 0.862 0.834 0.631 0.833 0.794 0.797 0.942
dk 0.65* 0.744 0.889 0.764 0.868 0.772 0.858 0.954
de 0.195 0.413 0.867 0.722 0.845 0.225 0.818 0.957
es 0.0906 0.208 0.0302 0.924 0.939 0.916 0.912 0.903
fr 0.377* 0.598 0.0521 0.113 0.945 0.767 0.882 0.908
it 0.145 0.341 0.093 -0.00299 0.212 0.902 0.909 0.877
nl 0.885* 1.01* 1.56* 0.269 0.876* 0.35 0.866 0.942
pt 0.076 0.101 0.0355 0.0702 0.154 -0.0142 0.201 0.841
uk 0.136 0.147 0.0929 0.127 0.152 0.116 0.408* 0.131
Clothing – Series 1210 (1/81 - 7/95)
be de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.882 0.956 0.737 0.932 0.877 0.778 0.952
de 0.209 0.939 0.708 0.902 0.122 0.759 0.97
es 0.195 0.00537 0.986 0.971 0.95 0.857 0.909
fr 1.07* -0.0125 0.0943 0.983 0.765 0.843 0.896
it 0.236* 0.0496 -0.0411 0.172 0.924 0.892 0.904
nl 1.35* 1.9* 0.449 0.935* 0.356 0.827 0.941
pt 0.191 0.0614 0.0887 0.164 0.0387 0.275 0.816
uk 0.18 0.146 0.159 0.213 0.152 0.575* 0.118Footwear – Series 1220 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.617 0.946 0.966 0.769 0.969 0.813 0.784 0.937
dk 0.673* 0.863 0.893 0.195 0.888 0.779 0.736 0.959
de 0.118 0.405 0.932 0.763 0.898 0.617 0.832 0.956
es 0.0735 0.0936 0.0161 0.981 0.988 0.899 0.811 0.848
fr 0.325 0.233 0.0172 0.13 0.983 0.598 0.834 0.873
it 0.0598 0.136 0.015 -0.0513 0.118 0.885 0.891 0.877
nl 1.06* 1.73* 3.15* 0.237 0.764* 0.377 0.782 0.911
pt 0.205 0.224 0.118 0.13 0.395* 0.089 0.438 0.817
uk 0.0625 0.0582 0.0418 0.0836 0.0729 0.0925 0.504 0.117
Rents – Series 1300 (5/78 - 12/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.427 0.654 0.917 0.411 0.87 0.743 0.479 0.813
dk 0.668* 0.268 0.936 0.723 0.809 0.398 0.511 0.886
de 0.157 0.245 0.914 0.594 0.696 0.5 0.52 0.824
es 0.107 0.0991 0.101 0.939 0.856 0.936 0.458 0.791
fr 0.638* 0.639* 0.133 0.08 0.853 0.696 0.446 0.841
it 0.265 0.493* 0.149 0.266 0.196 0.771 0.757 0.738
nl 0.707* 0.455* 1.78* 0.279 0.482* 0.502* 0.552 0.833
pt 0.335 0.359 0.289 0.334 0.447* 0.487* 0.339 0.502
uk 0.382* 0.383* 0.314* 0.438* 0.38* 0.367* 0.456* 0.341*
Fuel and Energy – Series 1330 (1/80 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be -0.0855 0.383 0.567 0.159 0.766 0.452 0.0786 0.739
dk 0.67* -0.0371 0.535 0.311 0.59 0.0455 0.143 0.862
de 0.36 0.788* 0.664 0.265 0.627 0.0207 0.148 0.836
es 0.491* 0.365 0.326 0.665 0.811 0.737 0.0177 0.816
fr 0.955* 0.912* 0.435* 0.503* 0.852 0.431 0.286 0.846
it 0.515* 0.451* 0.35 0.592* 0.518* 0.663 0.599 0.866
nl 0.95* 0.48 1.42* 0.508* 0.785* 0.451* 0.299 0.809
pt 0.337 0.389* 0.284 0.49* 0.395 0.301 0.282 0.495
uk 0.203 0.294 0.0561 0.393* 0.243 0.3* 0.133 0.27Household Equipment – Series 1400 (1/77 - 12/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.525 0.84 0.841 0.657 0.847 0.824 0.863 0.946
dk 0.167 0.682 0.906 0.882 0.948 0.699 0.865 0.966
de 0.0294 0.126 0.841 0.707 0.848 0.822 0.841 0.964
es 0.0593 0.00753 0.0508 0.909 0.876 0.84 0.894 0.927
fr 0.0803 0.168 0.0614 0.0769* 0.966 0.702 0.843 0.949
it 0.0565 0.043 0.0449 0.0487 0.1 0.851 0.876 0.934
nl 0.0215 0.123 0.406* 0.0207 0.0289 0.0101 0.834 0.968
pt 0.227* 0.152 0.163 0.118 0.191 0.0637 0.101 0.874
uk 0.0421 0.0075 0.00384 0.0443 0.0812 0.0506 -0.00208 0.0904
Furniture – Series 1410 (1/81 - 9/94)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.883 0.923 0.971 0.849 0.961 0.896 0.833 0.972
dk 0.5* 0.737 0.985 0.887 0.981 0.724 0.9 0.957
de 0.0407 0.0204 0.947 0.856 0.918 0.717 0.826 0.972
es -0.0101 0.00363 0.013 0.991 0.981 0.938 0.906 0.922
fr 0.282 0.205 0.0369 0.0498 0.991 0.79 0.874 0.934
it 0.0703 -0.0456 0.0293 -0.0371 0.0587 0.895 0.932 0.932
nl 0.0837 0.0503 0.617* 0.0183 0.039 0.0267 0.817 0.979
pt 0.05 0.0688 0.0326 0.0325 0.0825 0.079 0.0437 0.864
uk 0.142 0.154 0.183 0.088 0.215* 0.155 0.145 0.0772
Domestic Appliances – Series 1420 (1/81 - 9/94)
be de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.818 0.963 0.823 0.956 0.849 0.681 0.957
de 0.122 0.893 0.694 0.848 0.457 0.625 0.981
es 0.00795 0.0391 0.974 0.96 0.904 0.592 0.894
fr 0.335* 0.0566 0.086 0.98 0.751 0.56 0.937
it 0.0865 0.0855 0.0682 0.0756 0.865 0.742 0.937
nl 0.0396 0.793* 0.0121 0.0515 0.0215 0.629 0.989
pt 0.137 0.0749 0.13 0.131 0.0586 0.0322 0.724
uk -0.0362 -0.00274 0.0146 0.0393 0.0626 -0.000946 0.0239Transport and Communications – Series 1600 (1/77 - 12/95)
be dk de fr it nl uk
be 0.607 0.933 0.859 0.97 0.936 0.972
dk 0.686* 0.819 0.846 0.975 0.853 0.979
de 0.161 0.231* 0.936 0.97 0.251 0.981
fr 0.334* 0.387* 0.137* 0.968 0.948 0.961
it 0.0689 0.0731 0.081 0.14 0.974 0.906
nl 0.122 0.227 1.01* 0.0885 0.053 0.982
uk 0.00739 0.0818 0.0593 0.0572 0.299* 0.0152
Vehicles – Series 1610 (1/81 - 7/95)
be de es fr it nl uk
be 0.632 0.898 0.632 0.902 0.694 0.923
de 0.292* 0.912 0.618 0.75 0.287 0.97
es 0.36* 0.191 0.906 0.89 0.923 0.928
fr 0.439 0.276* 0.21 0.909 0.743 0.915
it 0.371 0.158 0.152 0.22 0.777 0.864
nl 0.132 0.989* 0.214 0.182 0.154 0.981
uk 0.178 -0.0146 0.25 0.123 0.0698 0.128
Public Transport – Series 1630 (4/82 - 7/95)
dk de es fr it nl uk
dk 0.236 0.903 0.749 0.838 0.44 0.816
de 0.715* 0.909 0.659 0.779 -0.492 0.935
es 0.196 0.124 0.94 0.938 0.938 0.83
fr 1.15* 0.285 0.193 0.894 0.784 0.88
it 0.466* 0.283 0.742* 0.287 0.852 0.791
nl 0.994* 0.905* 0.136 0.782* 0.189 0.869
uk 0.163 0.246* 0.133 0.158 0.261* 0.202*
Recreation – Series 1700 (1/77 - 12/95)
be dk de es fr it nl uk
be 0.697 0.837 0.913 0.74 0.899 0.886 0.951
dk 0.192 0.577 0.961 0.92 0.937 0.731 0.971
de 0.236 0.253* 0.889 0.689 0.836 0.417 0.961
es 0.126 0.108 0.168 0.962 0.933 0.92 0.952
fr 0.186 0.265 0.0874 0.134 0.949 0.766 0.963
it 0.11 0.201 0.113 0.0818 0.134 0.875 0.945
nl 0.291* 0.256 1.37* 0.128 0.132 0.109 0.969
uk 0.0414 0.00512 0.142 0.00887 0.0169 0.103 0.0654Sound and Photographic Equipment – Series 1710 (1/81 - 7/95)
be de es fr it nl uk
be 0.672 0.933 0.775 0.956 0.806 0.955
de 0.41* 0.907 0.809 0.861 0.212 0.965
es 0.164 0.0742 0.96 0.958 0.934 0.947
fr 0.678* 0.0506 0.116 0.964 0.846 0.972
it 0.162 0.0551 0.0738 0.0321 0.914 0.943
nl 0.423* 0.861* 0.157 0.158 0.0438 0.971
uk 0.128 0.00923 0.0211 -0.00159 0.0145 0.049
Leisure – Series 1720 (1/81 - 7/95)
be es fr nl pt uk
be 0.953 0.778 0.853 0.804 0.906
es 0.203 0.941 0.96 0.664 0.893
fr 0.683* 0.321* 0.734 0.695 0.875
nl 0.1 0.096 0.356* 0.734 0.954
pt 0.139 0.203 0.188 0.0396 0.712
uk 0.0214 0.0772 0.291 0.121 0.0789
Books – Series 1730 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de fr it nl uk
be 0.785 0.892 0.696 0.889 0.907 0.952
dk 1.12* 0.589 0.629 0.89 0.593 0.961
de 0.225 0.21 0.695 0.8 0.239 0.944
fr 0.4* 0.655* 0.163 0.915 0.739 0.96
it 0.317 0.287 0.274 0.358* 0.833 0.89
nl 0.567* 0.396 1.47* 0.199 0.176 0.946
uk -0.00644 0.0361 0.0243 0.123 0.0465 0.148
Hotels – Series 1830 (1/81 - 7/95)
be dk de es fr it nl pt uk
be 0.837 0.925 0.928 0.646 0.932 0.947 0.782 0.973
dk 1.05* 0.563 0.963 0.818 0.965 0.73 0.876 0.94
de 0.289 0.0416 0.91 0.75 0.87 0.536 0.806 0.984
es 0.155 0.167 0.0344 0.958 0.982 0.923 0.896 0.907
fr 0.433* 0.281 0.096 0.128 0.972 0.788 0.838 0.929
it 0.212 0.186 0.137 0.0872 0.112 0.903 0.945 0.919
nl 0.189 0.152 1.96* 0.12 0.114 0.228* 0.819 0.979
pt 0.305 0.281 0.14 0.164 0.267 0.177 0.157 0.877









uk = United Kingdom
The upper triangle of each table is the correlation of the log of the nominal exchange rate
between the indicated pair of countries, st , and the log of the relative price, s p p t it it + -
* , where
pit
*  and  pit  are the nominal prices in each country.
The lower triangle of each table reports the coefficient b from the error-correction
regression:
D D D ( ) ( ) ( ) p p e e p it it it it t j t j j
k
j it j it j j
k
- = - - - + + - - = - - = ￿ ￿ p a b p l g p 0 1 .
The * next to the coefficients in the lower triangle means significant at 95% level.